We study a production economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level but perfectly divisible at the overall economy level. In order to facilitate the exchange in this setting, we introduce a perfectly divisible parameter that does not enter into consumer preferences (fiat money). When consumption goods are indivisible, a Walras equilibrium does not necessarily exist. We introduce a rationing equilibrium concept and proof its existence. Unlike the standard Arrow-Debreu model, fiat money can always have a strictly positive price at the rationing equilibrium. In our set up a rationing equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium, provided that the initially endowed of fiat money is dispersed.
indivisible goods would be approximated by a Walras equilibrium of an economy with perfectly divisible goods?
In order to address the question above, we present a model where indivisibility is negligible at the overall economy level, but relevant at the individual level. This is achieved by assuming that a continuum of agents (consumers and producers) participate in the economy such that individual exchanges are carried out with only indivisible goods. In order to facilitate the exchange in such a setting, like Drèze and Müller [10] , we add a continuum parameter as part of the fundamentals of the economy. This parameter might be interpreted as fiat money. It has no intrinsic value whatsoever, since it does not enter into consumers' preferences. 2 Indivisibility of consumption goods implies that the Walras demand may fail to be upper hemi -continuous. This leads us to introduce a regularized notion of demand, called weak demand.
Under the assumptions we consider, the weak demand will always be an upper hemi-continuous correspondence, coinciding with the Walras demand when consumption goods are perfectly divisible. Based on the weak demand, we will then define a rationing equilibrium, where the consumers demand is a refinement of the auxiliary weak demand. At a rationing equilibrium, in order to formulate their demand, consumers will need in addition to the prices an aggregate knowledge on the demand supply imbalance in the market summarized by an endogenously determined pointed cone. This cone indicates the net trade directions for which rationing can occur. We will then be interested in the situations where agents only prefer points in their budget set which would require the execution of a net trade in the cone, for which rationing can occur. The cone is pointed, implying that if there exists a somehow excessive demand for a certain net-trade direction, there occurs no rationing in the exact inverse net-trade direction.
The main result of this paper is the proof of the existence of a rationing equilibrium, with a strictly positive price for fiat money (Theorem 4.1). However, when consumer's initial endowment in fiat money is dispersed, rationing occurs at most for a null set of the consumers, and then the rationing equilibrium reduces to a Walras equilibrium. Hence, the present paper also establishes a Walras equilibrium existence result for the case where all consumption goods are indivisible. The e ciency and core equivalence properties of a rationing equilibrium are studied in Florig and Rivera [12] . There it is proven that rationing equilibria satisfy the First and Second Welfare theorems for weak Pareto optimality, and that they coincide with the rejective core proposed by Konovalov [22] .
So far, we have not mentioned the vast literature on indivisible goods, which can be roughly 2 In the convex case, when the non-satiation assumption does not necessarily hold for consumers, one may establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium by allowing for the possibility that some agents spend more than the value of their initial endowment. The corresponding generalization of the Walras equilibrium is called dividend equilibrium or equilibrium with slack (see Aumann and Drèze [4] , Balasko [5] , Makarov [23] and Mas-Colell [25] among others). This concept was first introduced in a fixed price setting by Drèze and Müller [10] . Kajii [19] shows that this dividend approach is equivalent to considering a Walras equilibrium with an additional commodity called fiat money. If local non-satiation holds, fiat money is worthless and we are back in the standard Arrow-Debreu setting. However, if the satiation problem occurs, fiat money may have a positive price at equilibrium. If a consumer does not want to spend his entire income on goods, he can satisfy his budget constraints with equality by buying fiat money, provided that fiat money has a positive price. In our set up, since all goods are indivisible local non-satiation cannot hold at any point. divided into two di↵erent approaches. The first approach follows Shapley and Scarf [28] , who model a market without perfectly divisible goods, assuming only one commodity per agent. Under suitable conditions, they prove that the core of the economy is non-empty and that a competitive equilibrium exists. Subsequent extensions of their results can be found in Inoue [17, 18] , Konishi etál [21] , Sönmez [29] and Wako [31] . For these models, the existence of a competitive equilibrium depends strongly on the number of agents and/or the number of indivisible goods existing in the economy.
The second approach follows Henry [15] , and considers an economy with indivisible commodities but at least one perfectly divisible commodity, which might be interpreted as commodity money (see Bikhchandani and Mamer [6] , Broome [8] , Khan and Yamazaki [20] , Mas-Colell [24] , Quinzii [26] , van der Laan et al. [30] ; see Bobzin [7] for a survey). All these works suppose that money satisfies overriding desirability, i.e., it is so desirable by the agents that an adequate amount of money could replace the consumption of any bundle of indivisible goods. Under such an assumption they can prove the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a Walras equilibrium.
The approach we follow is similar to the one developed by Dierker [9] , who established the existence of a quasi-equilibrium for exchange economies without perfectly divisible consumption goods.
However in that approach, agents do not necessarily receive an individually rational commodity bundle at a quasi-equilibrium, a drawback that a rationing equilibrium overcomes. This paper is organized as follows. Mathematical preliminaries used throughout this paper are presented in Section 2. The economic model, as well as the equilibrium notions, are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to present the equilibrium existence results. Most of the proofs are established in the appendix, i.e. Section 5.
Mathematical notations
In the following, x t is the transpose of a vector x 2 R m , x · y = x t y the inner product between
x, y 2 R L , kxk the Euclidean norm of x, and x ? = {p 2 R m , p · x = 0} is the hyperplane in R m orthogonal to x. The origin of R m is 0 m , and the open ball with center x and radius " > 0 is B(x, "). Additionally, cl K, int K and conv K denote, respectively, the closure, interior and the convex hull of subset K ✓ R m , while its positive hull is
.
A cone K ⇢ R m is "pointed" when K \ K = {0 m }, and the set of pointed cones of R m is denoted C m . Furthermore, for a couple of sets K 1 , K 2 ✓ R m , ⇠ 2 R and p 2 R m , we denote
By denoting
while the inner limit is the set lim inf
We say the sequence converges in the sense of Kuratowski -Painlevé to K ✓ R m if lim sup
The outer limit of a correspondence F :
and this correspondence is said outer semicontinuous atx if lim sup
. We note the outer semicontinuity F atx is not equivalent to the upper hemi-continuity of F at that point. 3 However, when F is closed valued, by Theorem 5.19 in Rockafellar and Wets [27] the equivalence holds under the condition that F is locally bounded atx.
Given N 2 N ⇤ 1 and {z n } n2N a sequence of elements in R m , we denote by
z} the accumulation points of {z n } n2N . We now remind the integral of a correspondence F :
For the aim of this paper, it is su cient to consider that K 1 is a compact set, and K 2 is a closed set. Provided they are non-empty sets, using the standard Lebesgue measure, the set of Lebesgue
. Following Aubin and Frankowska [2] , §8.6, we define
3 The model
The economy and assumptions
By abuse of notation, we denote by L = {1, . . . , L}, I = {1, . . . , I} and J = {1, . . . , J} the finite sets of consumption goods, consumers and firms, respectively. We assume that each type of agent i 2 I and j 2 J corresponds to a continuum of identical individuals indexed by compacts subsets
Given that, the set of consumers and firms is respectively denoted by
The type of producer t 2 J is j(t) 2 J, and each firm of type j 2 J is characterized by a production set Y j ⇢ R L . The aggregate production set for firms of type j 2 J is the convex hull of (T j )Y j , where (·) is the standard Lebesgue measure in R. A production plan for a firm t 2 J is denoted by y(t) 2 Y j(t) , and the set of admissible production plans is
The type of consumer t 2 I is i(t) 2 I, and each consumer of type i 2 I is characterized by a consumption set X i ⇢ R L , an initial endowment of resources e i 2 R L and a strict preference correspondence P i :
, and the set of admissible consumption plans is
The total initial resources of the economy is e = P i2I (T i )e i 2 R L , and for (i, j) 2 I ⇥ J, ✓ ij 2 [0, 1] is the consumer of type i's share in firms of type j. As usual, we assume for every j 2 J,
In addition, we also assume that each consumer t 2 I is initially endowed with an amount of fiat money m(t) 2 R + , assuming m 2 L 1 (I, R + ). Note that consumers t, t 0 of the same type may be initially endowed with di↵erent amounts of fiat money.
An economy E is a collection
and the feasible consumption-production plans of E are the elements of
The following assumptions will be used at di↵erent points in this paper. The strongest condition we will use is the finiteness of consumption and production sets (i.e. the number of their elements is finite). The rest of our assumptions are relatively weak. Indeed, we will not need a strong survival condition, that is our consumers may not initially own a strictly positive quantity of every good, and the interior of the convex hull of the consumption sets may even be an empty-set (compare with Arrow and Debreu [1] ).
Assumption F. For all i 2 I, and for all j 2 J, the sets X i and Y j are finite.
Assumption C. For all i 2 I, P i is irreflexive and transitive. 4
Assumption M. The function m : I ! IR + is bounded and for a.e. t 2 I, m(t) > 0.
Supply, demand and the equilibrium concepts
The main goal at this part is to introduce two new equilibrium concepts. The first, called weak equilibrium, is auxiliary, while the second, called rationing equilibrium, is our main concept.
L }} , respectively, the profit, the Walras supply and the rationing supply 5 of type j 2 J firms. Observe that, by definition, j (p, K) ⇢ S j (p). Moreover, when p 6 = 0 L , for
we have j (p, K(p)) = S j (p). The income of consumer t 2 I is denoted by
and the resulting budget set is
are, respectively, the Walras, weak and rationing demand for consumer t 2 I.
We observe that, by definition,
For p 6 = 0 L and the cone given by (2)
Remark 3.1. Note that perfect divisibility of fiat money is not enough to guarantee that the Walras demand d t (p, q) is upper-hemi continuous when goods are indivisible. 6 However, when d t (p, q) is closed valued and locally bounded (which we will ensure), its outer regularization D t (p, q), is upperhemi continuous (cf Section 2).
The following proposition is proven in Section 5. It has important implications concerning the relationships among the equilibrium concepts we have defined. Proposition 3.1. Suppose Assumption F holds and q m(t) > 0, then
Therefore, if the assumptions of the proposition hold true, then:
The following example should motivate the introduction of our main equilibrium concept, and illustrates why the weak equilibrium might only be viewed as an auxiliary concept. Moreover, it illustrates the important role of fiat money in our framework. In this example we consider a finite set of consumers. However, we could replace each consumer by a continuum of identical consumers, with a constant initial endowment of fiat money per type and the same Lebesgue measure for each type, without altering the conclusions. 
We notice, however, when m 2 = m 3 m 4 there also exists a weak equilibrium allocation x ⇤ , supported by the same price, with
A situation like this would be, in a certain sense, "unstable" with respect to the information (prices) available by the consumers. For instance, if consumers 2 and 3 knew each others preferences and allocations, they could continue exchanging leading to allocation
However, the weak equilibrium (x ⇤ , p, q) cannot be supported by a rationing equilibrium. Otherwise, defining
we would need the existence of a pointed cone K such that K i (x ⇤ i ) ✓ K, for all i 2 I. However, as 0
, it follows that such a cone K cannot be pointed.
Using the allocation in (3) and the definition in (4), by setting
then it is easy to see that (x, p, q, K(x)) is a rationing equilibrium. 8 Note that for all i 2 I \ {4}, x i is a maximal element in the budget set, and thus for those consumers the cone K(x) -which was in fact introduced in order to define a concept of demand less restrictive than the Walras demand, but more restrictive than the weak demand-is somehow irrelevant. Consumer i = 4 could just about a↵ord x 0 4 = (0, 0, 1) by selling all his initial endowment in goods and fiat money. The vector z = x 0 4 x 4 = ( 1, 0, 1) is in K(x), and we could think of z -or including the amount of money of consumer i = 4, (z, m 4 ) t -as a net-trade direction (in terms of goods and paper money) for which consumers might be rationed. In fact, in the present example it is the only a↵ordable net-trade direction in K(x) which matters here.
Remark 3.2. The Cone K in the rationing equilibrium definition will be determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium, and summarizes the information that each consumer needs to have in addition to market prices (and their own characteristics) in order to formulate a demand, leading to a stable economic situation, in the sense that no further trading can take place making all participants in a second round of trading strictly better o↵ (see Florig and Rivera [12] ). 9 It seems natural to us to impose that K is pointed, since if there is some rationing for a net-trade direction z 2 R L , say due to some sort of excessive-demand, then it should be easy to find counterpart for the opposite net-trade direction, z.
Existence of equilibrium
The next theorem is the main result of this paper. The proof is given in Section 5, the Appendix. Proof. Let (x, y, p, q) be a weak equilibrium with q > 0 implied by Theorem 4.1. If (x, y, p, q) is not a Walras equilibrium, there would exists i 2 I and T 0
. By the finiteness of X i , we can choose T 0 i such that x(t) is constant on T 0 i . Therefore there exists ⇠ 2 X i , such that for all t 2 T 0 i , ⇠ 2 P i (x(t)) and p · ⇠ = w t (p, q). It follows that
and by definition (cf Section 2)
Let ⇠ 2 D t (p, q), and for n 2 N, let ⇠ n , p n and q n from the identity in (5) . For all n 2 N, and all x 0 2 P i(t) (⇠ n ), p · x 0 > w t (p n , q n ) p n · ⇠ n , and therefore ⇠ n 6 2 conv P i(t) (⇠ n ). Assumption F implies trivially that P i(t) has an open graph in X i(t) and therefore ⇠ 6 2 conv P i(t) (⇠). Moreover, as w t is well defined and continuous in (p, q), inf p · P i(t) (⇠) w t (p, q), and therefore D t (p, q) ✓ a t (p, q). For the opposite inclusion, let ⇠ 2 a t (p, q). If p · ⇠ < w t (p, q), then for " > 0 small enough, ⇠ 2 d t (p, q "), and therefore ⇠ 2 D t (p, q). Thus, assume p · ⇠ = w t (p, q). Since ⇠ 6 2 conv P i(t) (⇠), from the Hahn-Banach separation theorem (see, for example, Rockafellar and Wets [27] ), and the finiteness of P i(t) (⇠), there existsp 2 R L such that inf p · P i(t) (⇠) >p · ⇠. For " > 0 small enough, define p " = p + "p and
Note that lim "!0 (p " , q " ) = (p, q). Moreover, for small " > 0, inf p " · P i(t) (⇠) > p " · ⇠ = w t (p " , q " ) and therefore ⇠ 2 d t (p " , q " ). Hence, ⇠ 2 D t (p, q).
Existence of rationing equilibria
The proof of Theorem 4.1 rests on the existence of a weak equilibrium (see Definition 3.1), which is given in Section 5.2.2. For this result we need some technical lemmata provided in Section 5.2.1.
The proof of the Theorem 4.1 is given in Section 5.2.3.
Technical results
This first lemma is a straightforward extension of the well-known Debreu-Gale-Nikaido lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let " 2]0, 1] and ' : B(0 L , ") ◆ R L be an upper hemi-continuous correspondence, with nonempty, convex, compact values. If for some b > 0,
then there existsp 2 B(0 L , ") such that, either (i) 0 L 2 '(p) or (ii) kpk = " and 9 ⇠ 2 '(p) such that ⇠ andp are collinear, with k⇠k  b 1 " " .
Proof. From the properties of ', we can select a convex compact subset K ⇢ R L such that '(p) ⇢ K, p 2 B(0 L , "). Consider now the correspondence F :
From Kakutanis' Fixed Point Theorem, F has a fixed point, (p, ⇠). If kpk < ", then ⇠ = 0 L . If kpk = ", then from the definition of F ,p and ⇠ are collinear. Therefore, k⇠k  b 1 " " .
Hereinafter, by convenience regarding the notation, vectors of R m are supposed to be a columns, and for r 2 N, [ 1 , . . . , r ] 2 R m⇥r is the matrix with columns 1 , . . . ,
. . , r · x) t 2 R r , and for K ⇢ R m , we set
Furthermore, for m 2 N, the lexicographic order on R m is denoted by  lex . 10 The maximum and the argmax with respect to this order are denoted by max lex and argmax lex , respectively. In the following, a lexicographic decomposition of : N ! R m as before is denoted by {{ r , " r } r=1,...,k , N}.
Lemma 5.2. Every sequence : N ! R m \ {0 m } admits a lexicographic decomposition.
Proof. By setting b 1 (n) = (n), n 2 N, there are 1 2 R m , with k 1 k = 1, and N 1 2 N ⇤ 1 , such that
Recursively, for r 2 {1, . . . , m 1}, given r 2 R m , k r k = 1, and N r 2 N ⇤ 1 , we define H r = ?
If there exists N 0 ⇢ N r such that b r+1 (n) = 0 m for all n 2 N 0 , then we set N = N 0 , otherwise choose
and define H r+1 = ? r+1 . Therefore, by construction, for each r 2 {1, . . . , m 1}, the subset n b r+1 (n), n 2 N r+1 o is contained in a subspace of dimension m r. Thus, there are k 2 {1, . . . , m} and N 0 2 N ⇤ 1 , N 0 ⇢ N k , such that b k+1 (n) = 0 m and b k (n) 6 = 0 m on N 0 . We set N = N 0 , and then, by construction, we have that the vectors of { 1 , . . . , k } are two-by-two orthonormal. For all n 2 N and all r 2 {1, . . . , k}, r is orthogonal to b r+1 (n), and the following holds for each r 2 {1, . . . , k 1}:
from which we have (n) = P k r=1 " r (n) r , with " r (n) = b r (n) · r > 0. Developing " r (n), we have
, and therefore " r+1 (n)/" r (n) ! N 0.
Lemma 5.3. Let {{ r , " r } r=1,...,k , N} be a lexicographic decomposition of : N ! R m \ {0 m } and let z 2 R m . There existsn 2 N such that for all n >n with n 2 N:
Lemma 5.5. Let {(p n , q n ) 2 R m ⇥ R} n2N a sequence for which {{(p r , q r ), " r } r=1,...,k , N} is a lexicographic decomposition. Assume that (q 1 , . . . , q k ) t 6 = 0 k , and let ⇢ the smallest r 2 {1, . . . , k} such that q r 6 = 0. For n 2 N, define
Let z 2 R m and for T ⇢ R, let µ : T ! R, such that for all t 2 T ,
and q ⇢ µ(t) is bounded from below on T . Then there existsn 2 N, such that for all t 2 T and all n 2 N, n >n,p n · z q n µ(t).
Proof. For r 2 {1, . . . , k}, we set P(r) = [p 1 , . . . , p r ] t and Q(r) = (q 1 , . . . , q r ) t . Using this, we notice P(k)z  lex µ(t) Q(k) implies that P(⇢) z  lex µ(t) Q(⇢). We will split the remainder into two cases.
In this case P(⇢) z  lex µ(t) Q(⇢) implies that for all r 2 {1, . . . , ⇢}, p r · z  q r µ(t), from which we have that for all n 2 N and all t 2 T ,p n · z q n µ(t).
Case B. There exists s 2 {1, . . . , ⇢ 1} such that p s ·z < q s µ(t) = 0 and P(s 1) z = µ(t) Q(s 1). Let = p s · z > 0 and let µ = inf t2T q ⇢ µ(t). For n 2 N we set
By the fact that " s+1 (n) "s(n) ! N 0, and for r = s + 1, . . . , ⇢, "r(n) " s+1 (n) converges to zero for n 2 N, or is identically equal to 1, then we have b n ! N 0. Hence, there existsn such that for all n 2 N, n >n, a n + b n < /2 < 0, and then, for all t 2 T ,p n · z q n µ(t)  " s (n) (a n + b n ) < 0 for n as stated.
Existence of weak equilibrium
Proposition 5.1. If Assumptions F, C, S and M hold, then there exists a weak equilibrium for economy E, with a strictly positive price for fiat money.
Proof. The proof will be split into di↵erent steps.
Step 1. Perturbed equilibrium.
For n 2 N, n > 1, we set " n = 1 1/n. Given that, for t 2 I and j 2 J, the set-valued mappings
, are upper hemi-continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, we define the excess of demand corre-
which is nonempty, convex and compact valued, and upper hemi-continuous. Furthermore, for each n 2 N, n > 1, and p 2 B (0 L , " n ), we have
and therefore we can use Lemma 5.1 to conclude that for each n 2 N, n > 1, there exists
such that for a.e. t 2 I, x n (t) 2 D t (p n , q n ), and for a.e. t 2 J , y n (t) 2 S j(t) (p n ), with q n = 1 kp n k,
and (see (ii) in Lemma 5.1)
By Lemma 5.1, if for some n, p n < 1 1/n, then '(p n ) = 0 L , and (x n , y n , p n , q n ) would therefore be a weak equilibrium with q n > 0. For the sequel we will assume that q n = 1/n.
Step 2 . Lexicographic price decomposition.
Since q n > 0, by Lemma 5.2 there exists {{(p r , q r ), " r } r=1,...,k , N}, a lexicographic decomposition of {(p n , q n ) 2 R L ⇥ R} n2N . Given that, we set
with ⇢ being the smallest r 2 {1, . . . , k} such that q r 6 = 0. As q n > 0, such ⇢  k exists and q ⇢ > 0. In the sequel, without loss of generality we assume N = N, and for r 2 {1, . . . , k} we denote P(r) = [p 1 , . . . , p r ] t and Q(r) = (q 1 , . . . , q r ) t .
Step 3. Supply: There exists n J and for all j 2 J, there exist A j ✓ B j ✓ Y j , such that for all n > n J with n 2 N and all j 2 J, S j (p n ) = A j ✓ B j = S j (p n ). Applying Lemma 5.4 twice for each j 2 J, we have n j 2 N such that for all n > n j ,
Step 4. Income: For all i 2 I, there exists z i 2 R L such that for all t 2 T i and n > n
For all j 2 J, let ⇣ j 2 argmax lex P(k)Y j .
Step 3 the establishes the result by setting for all i 2 I
Step 5. There existsn > n J such that for all t 2 I, ⇠ 2 X i(t) and n >n with n 2 N,
Let i 2 I and ⇠ 2 X i . Consider the partition of T i defined by the subsets:
. Since m(·) is bounded on every subset of I, we can apply Lemma 5.5 to the vector (⇠ z i(t) ) for
Proof of Theorem 4.1: existence of a rationing equilibrium
Proof. Let (x 0 , y 0 , p 0 , q 0 ) be a weak equilibrium of E with q 0 > 0. If p 0 = 0 L , then for a.e. t 2 I, P i(t) (x 0 (t)) = ; and then, for K = {0 L }, (x 0 , y 0 , p 0 , q 0 , K) is a rationing equilibrium. Otherwise let m 1 : I ! R ++ be a mapping strictly increasing and bounded. As consumption sets and the number of type of consumers are finite, we can define a finite set of types of consumers A = {1, . . . , A} satisfying the following:
For a 2 A we set
In a similar manner as done for consumers, we can define a finite set of types of producers B = {1, . . . , B} satisfying the following:
For b 2 B, let
, and then, denoting e 1 a = x a , we define the following auxiliary economy
, where m 1 defines the initial endowments of fiat money for each consumer, and ✓ ab satisfying the conditions for the privately ownership of the firms and P 1 a is the restriction of P a to X 1 a . Clearly the economy E 1 satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 5.1, hence there exists a weak equilibrium for this economy, with the price of fiat money strictly positive. Moreover, since m 1 satisfies Assumption D, from Corollary 4.1 there exists a Walras equilibrium (with fiat money) for the economy E 1 , which is denoted by (x 1 , y 1 , p 1 , q 1 ), with q 1 > 0. In the following, we denote P = [p 0 , p 1 ] t 2 R 2⇥L , and for t 2 I we set w t = (w 0 t , w 1 t ) 2 R 2 , with
and
where a(t) 2 A such that t 2 T a(t) .
Claim 5.1. For a.e. t 2 I, Px 1 (t)  lex w t ,. By definition of X 1 a , a 2 A, p 0 · x 0 (t) = p 0 · x 1 (t), a.e. t 2 I. Since for every r 2 {0, 1}, p r · x r (t)  w r t , we conclude Px 1 (t)  lex w t , for a.e. t 2 I.
Claim 5.2. For a.e. t 2 I, ⇠(t) 2 P i(t) (x 1 (t)) implies Px 1 (t) < lex P⇠(t). Let ⇠(t) 2 P i(t) (x 1 (t)). By construction, for a.e. t 2 I, x 1 (t) 6 = x 0 (t) implies x 1 (t) 2 P i(t) (x 0 (t)) and then, by transitivity of the preferences, ⇠ 2 P i(t) (x 0 (t)). Therefore, for a.e. t 2 I, ⇠ 2 P i(t) (x 0 (t)) and p 0 · x 1 (t) = p 0 · x 0 (t)  p 0 · ⇠. For t 2 I, the claim is thus satisfied for ⇠(t) 2 P i(t) (x 1 (t)) such that p 0 · x 1 (t) < p 0 · ⇠. For t 2 I and ⇠(t) 2 P i(t) (x 1 (t)) such that p 0 · x 1 (t) = p 0 · ⇠ we have ⇠ 2 X 1 a(t) and as (x 1 , y 1 , p 1 , q 1 ) is a Walras equilibrium of E 1 , it follows that p 1 ·x 1 (t) < p 1 ·⇠ for a.e. t 2 I satisfying p 0 · x 1 (t) = p 0 · ⇠. We will show that (x,ȳ,p,q) = (x 1 , y 0 + y 1 , p 0 , q 0 ) coupled with the pointed cone
is a rationing equilibrium. Let I 0 = t 2 I | Px 1 (t) < lex min lex PP i(t) (x 1 (t)) , and note that by Claim 5.2 (I \ I 0 ) = 0. Again by Claim 5.2, K contains 12
By the construction of K, it follows that for a.e. t 2 I 0 ,x(t) 2 t (p,q, K). Finally, by the construction of the iteration of weak equilibria, for a.e. t 2 J and all z 2 Y j , P(z ȳ(t))  lex 0 2 and therefore
From this we can conclude that for a.e. t 2 J ,ȳ(t) 2 t (p,q, K).
